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Abstract  
 
The paper shows, on the basis of longitudinal analysis of the British press, that public 
opinion of genetic research and biotechnology varies over two long-term waves: from 
1946 to 1972 and from 1973 to the 2000s. Each wave shows a nested phase of 
enthusiasm and of scepticism. During the first wave biological news has little salience 
and evaluation parallels the attitudes to general science. During the second wave 
genetic engineering becomes a major news item, and its phase of evaluation separates 
from that of general science and technology. While general science improves its 
public profile, biotechnology becomes publicly controversial during the 1990s. Public 
perceptions, as far as data is available, follows the changing trends of the press with 
some lag. For both waves of public sentiment the paper highlights events and topics 
that fuelled public imagination and that led to the present mix of controversies over 
genetic technology in food production, biomedicine and law enforcement. The 
watershed events of 1996 (gm soya) and 1997 (Dolly the sheep) did not initiate the 
trend changes which started already in mid 1980s, but catalysed an already 
established trend towards more sceptical sentiments in the late 1990s.    
 
Keywords: social representation, long-term trends in public opinion, media 
monitoring, DNA, genetics, biotechnology.  
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Opinion polls and studies of public sentiments towards genetic research in all its 
modes and applications abound, but only in recent year when public controversy has 
become apparent. Long-term continuous data streams on public opinion and public 
sentiment on anything is generally hard to come by. Outside voting intentions, the 
labour market, fear of crime, and the consumer climate, the social sciences have few 
established ‘weather stations’ that take readings of public sentiments comparable to 
the innumerous readings of temperature, humidity and wind speed that go into 
weather forecasts. The rule seems to be: no controversy, no opinion poll. For the long-
term study of public sentiments towards genetic research we suffer exactly that 
shortage of readings, but we may be able to compensate the handicap by resorting to 
longitudinal analysis of newsprint. The present paper analyses the trajectory of 
genetics in the British press between 1946 and 2002. The paper makes several 
conceptual, substantive and methodological points.  
 
 
Representation matters 
 
Despite post-modern ruminations of a ‘crisis of representation’, the presumption of 
this paper is that representation of biotechnology matters. ‘Representation’ has 
however several meanings. First, it means to speak on behalf of somebody, either in 
court for a client or in parliament for a constituency. Secondly, it means to collect 
data from a population in a unbiased manner ensuring that each member has the same 
chance of being selected (this meaning is part of our methodology, see below). And 
finally it refers to re-presenting something that is absent with semiotic tools such as 
iconic images, indexical markers, or word symbols, expressions or stories. And absent 
means being presently at a different location or a matter of imagination, or having had 
a past existence, or having a future as a not-yet-being. Representations thus 
accommodate reality and are a potential space, past and future. I will use the term 
‘representation’ mainly in the latter semiotic sense. Furthermore, representations are 
no private matter, but communicated among people. They are the resources we all use 
to make sense of the world and world events (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005; 
Jovchelovitch, 1996; Farr & Moscovici, 1984). Hence, representations of 
biotechnology, the focus of this paper, are not epiphenomena of a techno-political 
fait-accompli, but they are an integral part of the public sphere that, by focusing 
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attention, motivate and legitimate or question and resist this new technology (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 1999). A convenient data stream, albeit not the only one, for the 
reconstruction of representations is mass media reportage. A key problems is how 
representations come about, are sustained, and change over time in any public forum. 
Representations of any public issue are sponsored and contested by social actors, and 
in this contest we like to think of an emerging technology as a quasi-social movement 
that competes for public attention and thus enhances or shortens its future (see Bauer, 
2002b; Bauer & Gaskell, 2000).  
 
The analysis of media representations is complicated by the double nature of mass 
mediation: expression of public opinion on one hand, and lever of social influence on 
the other. Mass media are both means and mediator. Our daily news in Britain is in a 
classical sense public opinion. It is the expression of a constitutionally protected 
freedom of speech about matters of common interest in a competitive market of 
opinions.i But news and reportage is also influential in setting the agenda and framing 
the public opinion process: thus they are means to tell the people what to think about, 
and how to think about matters public. The mass media are the targets of strategic 
controls and thus prone to explicit and implicit bias.  
 
Content analysis of news makes two contributions. First, it shows what many actors 
were perceiving, or at least were able to, as public opinion at the time. Politicians, 
business people, civil servants and scientists attend to newsprint and thus encounter 
public opinion. For many the news is a marker of public opinion. This opinion is 
selected and elaborated by the daily practices of journalists and news production in a 
competitive market for audience attention (Hansen, 1993). It is like an exhibit in the 
London Tate Modern gallery: it reflects a mixture of ethos and the commercial and 
cultural sense for a good story. After all, newsprint responds to a readers’ market of 
attention; what is of no interest, does not sell; hence over time we expect, the stories 
that sell reflect the reader mentality by way of accommodation. Media analysis offers 
an index of ‘opinion in public’, while an individual reader may privately very well 
have ignored, agreed or disagreed with its contents. Secondly, the mass media 
circulate images and arguments and insinuate to the readers what to opine about. For 
many social actors, strategically intent upon setting the agenda on an issue such as 
biotechnology, media coverage is instrumental: to frame public discussions, to 
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cultivate certain views, and to persuade the public to support a certain course of 
action. In the long run, news coverage and reportage will, by way of simple 
redundancy, cultivate particular public views, thus create, stimulate or caution 
expectations of things to come. Mass media analysis offers therefore early indicators 
of public opinion in the making, albeit with a exaggerated amplitude. For example, 
‘sexing up’ is part and parcel of preparing the ground for new technology. There is 
method in hype and the modernist bias for innovation: ‘revolutionary’ innovations 
need the attention of funding agencies, venture capital and the young. Some occasions 
demand more moderate claims making and reassurance that nothing is in the making 
that might require new regulation and laws.ii Contradictory rhetoric comes with new 
technology, as different audiences need to be pleased.   
 
Thus, by looking over the shoulders of past newspaper readers, we can gauge how 
genetics was mirrored in society at different periods in time, and this, because 
independent of the polling industry, not only in times of controversy. This mirror, 
because of its double nature, however, is neither plain nor plane.  
 
The public sphere, topic salience and framing 
 
News is a dramatic narrative centred on events, actions, persons and a moral point 
(Schudson, 2003; Burke, 1945). Equally, science news offers the reader a 
personalised drama in and around science and technology. This idea of ‘drama’ has 
several implications. Firstly, it avoids the expectation that news reportage is 
isomorphic to scientific activities and is therefore to be judged by its ‘accuracy’. To 
the contrary science news as dramatic representation of science is to be judged by its 
rules of operation: the selection and elaboration of events according to news values, 
and by its contribution to the formation of public opinion (Neidhardt, 1993). 
Representations of science in newsprint are contributions in and for the public sphere, 
neither primarily true nor false, nor irrelevant, nor educational, nor entertaining. News 
foremost dramatises events to synchronise and modulate public attention, provides 
frames of interpretation and stimulates everyday conversations (Bauer & Gaskell, 
1999).   
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We distinguish public opinion from the public sphere on the one hand, and from 
opinion measurements on the other; three distinct but related concepts. The public 
sphere is an historical structure of forums where reasonable opinion emerge on 
matters of general concern, subject to the constraints of a ideal of free speech 
(Habermas, 1989). The public sphere requires constant vigilance against tendencies of 
decline. Within a public sphere, public opinion is a process that can be studied by its 
outcomes, classically a vote or an opinion poll. However, it is important to avoid the 
fallacy of operationalism and define public opinion by what public opinion polls 
measure. I research ‘public opinion’ as covariance of mass media contents and public 
perceptions over time. Like other measures, once visualised, they offer ‘movable 
immobiles’ of otherwise intangible phenomena. Secondly, the notion of drama 
focuses attention to the stage setting and the plot. The setting opens space, and the 
plot links acts and actors into complications and offers a moral. Here I consider two 
elements of such drama: the space given to and the evaluation of the act of ‘genetics’.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The long-term trends of the press coverage are reconstructed from two research 
databases of British media coverage. Weiii consider the number of articles in a single 
newspaper as indicator of public salience and the mean evaluation of genetics and 
biotechnology across the articles as an index of public attitudes. Our method is 
content analysis (e.g. Bauer, 2000; Krippendorff, 1980). With two simple indicators 
we characterise the unfolding public drama of genetics over the past 50 years. The 
value of this procedure is the simplicity and ease with which longitudinal data streams 
can be constructed. If public opinion is a process, then its faithful representation must 
at least be a dynamic picture.  
 
 
Data for the period 1946-73 
 
The database ‘Science and Technology in the British Press, 1946-92’ comprises 
newspaper articles dating from 1946 to 1992 (see Bauer et al., 1995). The corpus is a 
probability sample of press articles, stratified by year and newspaper including the 
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Daily Telegraphy, Daily Mirror, Daily Times, Daily Express, and the Guardian. The 
study coded scientific and technology themes (Q36 and Q37), for our purposes we 
selected the materials on biology or genetics. ‘Biotechnology’ was not a term in 
public discussions before the 1980s. Intensity scores are estimated based on the 
sample and weighted to a single source basis; the bi-annual scores are interpolated for 
the missing years. The ‘evaluation’ of the scientific event is rated for each article 
(code Q18) between 1 (= discourse of great promise) and  5 (= discourse of great 
concern). These ratings are recoded so that the neutral position is 0 (-2 to +2). Note 
that on average the pre-1973 evaluation of genetics is slightly on the negative side 
(mean = -0.15; std dev = 0.24; n=165). Annual mean scores are a reliable index of the 
changing evaluation of ‘genetics’ between 1946 and 1972. Inter-coder reliability of 
this process is 0.87.  
 
Data for the period 1973-99 
 
The international project  ‘Biotechnology and the Public’ conducted press monitoring 
of biotechnology news in the elite press for the period between 1973 and 2002 (see 
Durant, Bauer & Gaskell, 1998; Bauer & Howard, 2004). Salience figures are based 
on a single source outlet (UK: Times until 1987; Independent after 1987); until the 
mid 1980s figures are based on Times Index entries. In later years we have access to 
on-line resources and used the search keywords ‘genes’, ‘biotechnology’, ‘cloning’ or 
‘DNA’. We enumerate all references. Comparisons of different news outlets show a 
high annual correlation of topic salience, because of strong competition in the 
newspaper market. This suggests that a single source is a good enough long-term 
indicator. The content coding is based on an annually stratified random sample of 
articles. The ‘evaluation of biotechnology’ is based on two scales, a negative (Q23a: 0 
= not applicable; 1= slightly negative; 5 = discourse of great concern) and positive 
rating (Q23b: 0 not applicable; 1= slightly positive; 5 = discourse of great promise). 
The evaluation index is defined as the difference of positive and negative ratings. 
Note that on average the post-1973 ratings are positive (mean =  1.09; std dev = 1.90; 
n= 802).  
 
We consider these ratings functionally equivalent before and after 1973. For purposes 
of analysing long-term trends we calibrate the two series. The overlap of the two data 
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series from 1974 to 1992 helps to validate both intensity and valuation figures in the 
two series. We standardize the evaluation scores in both data series to their long-term 
average. The graphics below show the annual deviations from the long-term average 
(mean = 0, std dev = 1). The standard score of 1972 is slightly lower than that 1974; 
to link the two time-series we raise the pre-1973 series by adding a correction of 
(+)0.2 to standard score. This avoids the wrong impression of a ‘sudden jump’ in 
1972-74, which is likely an artefact of using different measures.  
 
Public perceptions: being optimistic about biotechnology  
 
The optimism index is based on the UK data of Eurobarometer, an instrument of the 
European Commission to monitor opinions across European member states. Each data 
point corresponds to a representative survey of the UK population with a sample of 
n=1300 face-to-face interviews (Britain and Northern Ireland). This instrument 
measured public attitudes to science and technology in general (EB 10a of 1978) or to 
biotechnology in particular (EB 35.1 of 1991; 39.1 of 1993, 46.1 of 1996, 52.1 of 
1999, 58 of 2002). One item serves here as a comparable index of ‘general optimism’ 
about biotechnology and genetic engineering. In 1978, The British and other 
Europeans were asked: 'do you think that the transmission of hereditary 
characteristics which could make it possible to improve the qualities of living species 
is worthwhile' (or of no particular interest, or an unacceptable risk). On later 
occasions the equivalent question reads 'do you think biotechnology will improve our 
way of life in the next 20 years' (or has no effect, or will make things worse, or don’t 
know). We report the percentage of ‘optimistic attitudes’ reflected in answering 
‘worthwhile’ (in 1978) and ‘will improve’ (from 1991 to 2002). All reported 
percentages have a maximal margin of error of (-/+) 3% at 95% confidence level.  
 
 
The Path of Genetics in British Public Opinion 
 
Figure 1 shows the salience and the evaluation of genetics/biotechnology in Britain 
over a 55-year period. The graphic shows the take-off of biology news, mainly 
biotechnology and genetic engineering news from the mid-1980s onwards. By 1999 
we find over 1600 references to ‘genes’, or 4 to 5 per day, in a single British national 
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quality newspaper.iv In the 1950s or 1960s, gene news was a monthly event at best. 
Clearly the British public gives sizable attention to this topic the second half of the 
1990s. 
  
Salience and evaluation of genetics and biotechnology in the British Quality Press
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Figure 1 shows the salience and evaluation of genetics and biotechnology 
news between 1946 and 2002 in the British quality press. The index of salience 
is 100 = 1999 representing a count of 1666 different references to 
biotechnology in a single source. The evaluation index shows the deviations 
from the long-term average. The evaluation is based on annual average 
ratings of articles as ‘discourse of promise’ (high values) or ‘discourse of 
concern’ (low values). Ratings are standardised and calibrated to the long-
term trends before and after 1973. The smooth lines show 6-year moving 
averages.  
 
The picture shows two waves of growing and declining enthusiasm for genetics. Until 
1960 the evaluation of genetics is ever more positive to turn more negative in the 
early 1970s. Then again until 1981 the news is ever more positive, only to reverse 
after the mid 1980s and into the 1990s. As biotechnology news expands, the discourse 
becomes more varied and more sceptical (note: the graphs denote deviations from the 
long-term mean and not the level of evaluation). However, despite these trend 
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changes and contrary to polemical perceptions of media coverage, the attitude of the 
British press stays positive (see Bauer et al., 1998). Both indicators, salience and 
evaluation, suggest two phases of news on genetics and biotechnology: a first period 
from 1946 to the early 1970s, and a second period from the early 1970s to the end of 
the century and probably beyond, each period with a phase of enthusiasm. The mid 
1970s are indeed the beginnings of what became known as ‘new biotechnology’ based 
on recombinant DNA techniques and direct interventions at the level of the gene. This 
is contrasted to ‘old biotechnology’ that intervenes, and has indeed done so for 
centuries, at the level of the cell with techniques such as fermentation or animal 
husbandry. Whether this was a ‘revolutionary’ watershed or not is still the sticky point 
of regulatory debates, and the key to the ‘transatlantic gap’ in the 1990s. Whether the 
production of transgenic farm animals can and should be regulated under the same 
rubric as age-old cheese making hinges on how this development is construed: 
process or product (Jasanoff, 2005).  
 
How does the path of biotechnology compare to that of science in general (see Bauer, 
2000; Bauer et al. 2006a). Over the post-war period the biomedical sciences (biology, 
medicine) displace the physical sciences (physics, geology, chemistry, astronomy) in 
public attention. Science reporting moves from the ‘rocket-scalpel’ to the ‘gene-
meteorite’ complex (Bauer, 1998). At the peak of science news in 1962, the physical 
sciences carry the big stories: nuclear power, ‘big bang’ and space explorations. The 
salience of genetics is insignificant and hardly affected by the Sputnik shock of 
October 1957 (our index shows a small increase in coverage between 1959 and 1961, 
which is however insignificant in the general surge of science news at the time). Its 
discourse of evaluation converges with that of general science: increased enthusiasm 
into the 1960s, declining into the 1970s. The 1970s sees much science-sceptical and 
anti-technological public sentiments. The rising salience of biotechnology since mid 
1980s is the new wave of science news. By the 1990s, biotechnology has become 
major news. However, the trend in the evaluation of biotechnology diverges from that 
of other sciences. British enthusiasm for science and technology recovers through the 
1980s and into the 1990s. While for genetic engineering enthusiasm decreases after its 
peak in 1981-1984. This public scepticism is specific to biotechnology and is not 
generalised to all science and technology as in the 1970s, when this was a matter of 
public alarm. The personal computer, astronomy and environmental research 
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command public fascination during this wave of science news. Streams of news of the 
Personal Computer (PC) in the 1980s and of the internet in the 1990s, had no limits, 
until in April/Mai 2000, the bubble burst and the stock market slumped into a major 
crisis. In hindsight much of this discourse was hyperbole but functional. In the 1990s 
Observers started to appreciate the significance and the persistence of exaggerated 
news as a driver of future expectations that enable new technologies.v Hype is not 
explained by the ‘enthusiastic bias’ of a handful of science writers.  
 
In summary, the first decline in enthusiasm for ‘genetics’ in the 1960s parallels that 
for general science with sceptical public sentiments rising in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. This sentiment is fuelled by self-criticisms emanating from scientific circles 
themselves. The second reversal of attitudes in the 1980s and 1990s is specific to 
genetic engineering and does not extend to other sciences; except maybe to nuclear 
power that continues to stay far from public grace. The evaluation of genetics 
separates from that of others sciences. A closer look at each period is revealing.  
 
Before 1973: the discovery phase in scientific mode     
 
Before 1972 is the phase of scientific discovery in genetics. In hind-sight, the key 
event was the presentation of the double helix model of DNA of Watson and Crick at 
Cambridge University in 1953 (Nobel Prize with Maurice Wilkins in 1962). Figure 2 
shows increased coverage of biology in the British press in 1952 and 1953, but the 
‘double helix’ had little echo at the time. It took weeks until the first isolated news 
reports of the helix model appeared (see Turney, 1998, p135), there is no Nobel effect 
in 1962. Its historic significance is a re-construction of the late 1960s, centred around 
Watson’s controversial account of the discovery and the now famous photo of the 
three dimensional helix model (Chadarevian, 2003), and of the 50-year celebrations in 
2003.  
 
In those days, most science news is in celebratory summaries of papers published in 
Nature and Science. Such news coverage tends to increase the public awareness of 
research and the citation counts of the authors by up to 70% over the next 10 years 
(see Philips, 1991). With an average of one article per month genetics news is 
insignificant compared to that of the physical sciences and to what will become the 
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level of genetics news in the 1990s. Science news, and there is increasing amounts in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, focuses on atom bombs and, after the Geneva ‘Atoms 
for Peace’ conference of 1955, increasingly on civil nuclear power and its potentials. 
Britain is a major player, linked the world’s first civil nuclear power station to the 
electricity grid in 1956 (Calder Hall) and enjoys the ‘special relationship’ with the US 
based on their joint nuclear capability. Genetics remains marginal news, but at times 
its surfs the news issue with stories on nuclear fallout and the risks of genetic 
mutations at various levels of radiation exposure (see Weart, 1988, 200ff).  
 
Salience and evaluation, 1946-73
R2 = 0.44
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
no
 o
f a
rt
ic
le
s
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
de
vi
at
io
n 
fr
om
 m
ea
n
salience
Eval-std
 
Figure 2 shows the trends for salience and evaluation of biology in the news 
during the period 1946 to 1972. The dashed line indicates a linear trend for 
salience with a fit of R2 = 0.44. The counts are numbers of articles per year in 
a single newspaper source, interpolated for every second year. The index of 
evaluation shows deviations from the long-term slightly negative average 
(mean evaluation =  - 0.15). Low numbers mean lower than average 
evaluation, high numbers mean higher than average evaluation. The smooth 
line is a moving 4-year average of evaluation.   
 
Genetic and biology news increases in the early 1960s, reflecting the expansion of 
medical and clinical genetics and the controversial continuity of pre-war eugenics 
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(Kevles, 1995). The conference ‘Man and His Future’ of 1963 features Julian Huxley, 
founder of the WWF and former director of UNESCO, linking eugenic ideas and 
nuclear fallout. He argues that to halt human genetic deterioration from radioactive 
fallout mankind urgently needs to freeze stocks of sperms of healthy and intelligent 
males for later use (see Thom & Jennings, 1996, 227). The British Eugenics Society 
tries to stem decline and changes its name to the Galton Foundation in 1969. The 
burgeoning of genetic research leads to the identification of gene anomalies 
associated with syndromes such as Down’s and Turner, and controversially links the 
latter to samples from convicted criminals in prison. In 1969, a London Hospital 
begins offering pre-natal diagnosis of Down’s syndrome using amniocentesis, by 
1972 35 clinics will have followed suit. These events are public news.   
 
The revival of eugenic ideas does not come without challenge considering its 
notorious past in Europe and North America (Koch, 2004). The low-key post-war 
enthusiasm for a ‘genetic revolution’ led by British science and anticipating the idea 
of gene mapping reverses in the early 1960s towards a more sceptical note into the 
1970s. Scientific issues are taken up by the student movements of 1968-69 
culminating in the controversies over intelligence and ‘Sociobiology’ in mid 1970s. A 
strong controversy over nature-nurture in human development, spilling over from the 
US, bestows notoriety to British psychologists Burt and Eysenck by the end of the 
1970s (see Gould, 1996). Note, that these are also the beginnings of the challenge to 
the neo-positivist and Mertonian canons in the philosophy and sociology of science.      
 
 
After 1973: the business phase in industrial mode 
 
The year 1973 is a watershed year for genetic engineering. Herbert W Boyer & 
Stanley Cohen of Stanford University, building on previous work by Paul Berg and by 
Annie Chang, secure a patent on their method of recombining DNA. This opens the 
new era of biotechnology with the prospect of a ‘genetic gold rush’: the commercial 
exploitation of design at the level of the gene. This watershed leaves a double legacy: 
it spawns a new business sector – Biotech or Life Sciences – and raises questions. In 
1976, Boyer founds one of the first biotech firms in California, GENENTECH. This 
act of scientific entrepreneurship models a boom of joint ventures between 
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universities and private capital in the 1980s and 1990s (Haber, 1996). Many of these 
young companies go to the stock market in the 1990s, which leads to a flood of 
hyperbole business news promising a lucrative future to potential investors.  
 
Media Saliance, Evaluation and Public Optimism on Biotechnology
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Figure 3 shows the rise and later fall in salience, the cycle of evaluation in the 
press, and the changing public optimism about biotechnology in opinion 
surveys. Salience is indexed to 100 in 1999, when 1666 articles on 
biotechnology were published in a single quality newspaper source (left 
scale). The index of evaluation shows the deviation from the long-term slightly 
positive average: low figures indicate evaluations more negative, positive 
figures indicate evaluations more positive than average (right scale: mean = 
0; std dev = 1). The dark bars give the percentage of UK respondents who 
declare optimistic expectations about biotechnology when asked in 1978, 
1991, 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 (left scale).   
 
On the other hand, the group of scientists involved in recombinant DNA research 
publish an open letter (Berg et al., 1974) simultaneously in Nature and Science 
pointing to potential hazards of their research. They call for a moratorium until the 
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risks of rDNA research are defined and contained. The 1975 Asilomar conference in 
California discusses these points in a semi-public forum. Similar discussions take 
placed in Britain and elsewhere. This is a historical first: hitherto scientists have been 
concerned with breaking the social constraints on their enquiries, now the avantguard 
blows the whistle on themselves (Yoxen 1983). Initially the concerns are laboratory 
and public health hazards, later environmental and developmental risks, and the ethics 
of such designs which put at disposition the very nature of ‘human nature’ (Rose,  
2001).   
 
Both streams of events prove historically significant, however, have little immediate 
public visibility as shown in figure 3. We find increased coverage by 1977-78, a dip 
in press evaluation, and a moderate level of optimism over these new developments in 
public perceptions; 38% of British think rDNA research is worthwhile. Soon the 
scepticism of Berg et al. and Asilomar will be displaced by the celebration of 
scientific progress and economic prospects of biotechnology (Yoxen, 1983), and the 
big story of 1977-78 is the birth of Louise Brown, the first test-tube baby (Turney, 
1998). In the 1970s, reproduction is part of the discourse of ‘biology turned into a 
technology’.  But Britain at the time worried about many other things: energy crisis, 
the winter of discontent, the punks, high inflation and several elections.  
 
By 1980 the new British government of Margaret Thatcher officially recognises, as 
did the OECD and others, that new biotechnology is the future. This is reflected in the 
rising enthusiasm in the press. Coverage grows exponentially and continued to do so 
to its peak in 1999, rising from a monthly news item to five or six stories a day in a 
single newspaper. The year 1984, the test year for Orwell’s dark predictions, sees the 
arrival of ‘DNA fingerprinting’, a British invention. Henceforth crime news carries 
genetic references. The identification of the remains of the former Russian royal 
family became ‘gene talk’ in the early 1990s (Durant, Hansen & Bauer, 1996). In 
1990 the European Community regulates the release of genetically modified 
organisms into the environment with leading British input, and the debate cools off: 
reduced salience but stable evaluations. At the time, many observers felt that the 
controversy over biotechnology, as far as there ever was one, was now settled and 
closed. In hind-sight, we now know it occurred differently.   
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For the 1990s we can compare public perceptions and mass media discourse. After 
1984 the media enthusiasm cools off, while optimism in public perceptions continues 
to rise until 1993. Optimistic attitudes increase from about one third in 1978 to over 
50% of the population by 1993. Thereafter optimism shrinks to 30% by 1999 and 
remains at that level by 2002. This trend reversal in public perceptions appears to 
follow that of the mass media discourse, but with a considerable time lag. However, 
our data is not conclusive here. I am not aware of any public perception data of 
biotechnology in the mid 1980s, when media enthusiasm was at its peak. A 
hypothetical poll in 1985 might show equally enthusiastic attitudes as displayed in the 
media discourse, and thus show a closely parallel decline in optimism in media and 
perceptions from the mid 1980s onwards. On the other hand 1985 is the year when the 
Royal Society laments the deficient public appreciation of science in its famous report 
(Royal Society, 1985), which, if the tone of that report can be considered evidential, 
would suggest that public attitudes did not mirror the media discourse at the time.   
 
1994 sees the arrival of genetically modified (gm) food products on supermarket 
shelves, the CALGENE Flavr Savr tomato in the US and the ZENECA tomato paste in 
Britain. Both products have a short life cycle, less because of consumer rejection - 
consumer were given little opportunity to make decisions - more because of corporate 
reasons (Martineau, 2001). The first consensus conference on plant biotechnology 
takes place in 1994. Experimenting with public participation, a model of public 
deliberation imported from Denmark (see Joss & Durant, 1995; Einsiedel, 2001), 
coincides with the launch of these first gm food products. The term ‘Frankenfood’ 
was coined either by the Daily Mail or the Telegraph alluding to the myth of Dr 
Frankenstein’s monstrous design which, once carelessly abandoned, strikes back. This 
image resonates with a public opinion that is already sensitised to food issues. Britain 
is going through a series of food scares and, since 1985, the BSE epidemic in cattle. 
‘MAD COW CAN KILL’ prints the Daily Mirror on the day following the 
government’s official admission of a link between BSE and vCJD (variant Creutzfeld- 
Jacob Disease) on 19 March 1996. The lingering issue of ‘dangerous British beef’ 
spreads through the mass media of Europe (Bauer et al, 2006b) and changes the scene 
for things to come.   
 
Public Career of DNA   MWB LSE Feb 2006 16
  New Genetics and Society 
Engulfed by a global mission and ignoring early warnings of limited consumer 
enthusiasm for gm food, available from Eurobarometer surveys (Gaskell et al.,  1997), 
the new Live Science sector and crop producers steam roll ahead. Imports of 
Monsanto’s Round-up Ready gm soya into Europe from autumn 1996 onwards fall 
into a climate of opinion that creates an opportunity for issue entrepreneurs (Lassen et 
al, 2002). An EU regulatory loophole on food labelling allows the mobilisation of 
consumer and environmental concerns. What follows puts into doubt not only the 
agrochemical multinational MONSANTO, but the entire project of  a ‘Second Green 
Revolution’ to feed the world in the 21st century. Sabotaged field trials, blockaded 
ships and other stunts create world wide attention. British food retailers such as 
TESCO and SAINSBURY pledge to avoid and to label products with gm ingredients. 
Gm feed and foods, now globally controversial, stall an emerging consensus in 
international regulations based on the US model of 1985. Europe sees a de-facto 
moratorium on gm crops and foods between 1998 and 2004 sustained by Brazilian 
exports of non-gm soya (Bauer, 2006).   
 
As if gm crops do not make enough ‘gene drama’, in February 1997, the Scottish 
Roslin Institute announces, in a letter to Nature, the first successful cloning of an 
adult sheep some 18 month ago (Wilmut et al, 1997). Photographs of Dolly the sheep 
gazing into the cameras travel fast and create concurrent world news. The story 
develops immediately into a moral outcry over the possibility of human cloning. 
Ironically, the translation of ‘adult nucleic transfer’ into ‘cloning’, which offers a 
much richer anchor for social representations, does not come from the scientists but 
from Nature’s own press release (Einsiedel et al, 2002). The more recent controversy 
over stem cell cloning takes its impetus from the Dolly alarm and merges with the 
lingering awareness of human genome mapping which started in 1990 with very little 
public attention (Durant, Hansen & Bauer, 1996).  
 
Gm soya and the cloning of Dolly are watershed events in the public career of 
genetics during 1990s. Henceforth, public discourses split into ‘green’ agricultural 
biotechnology, sceptically observed, and ‘red’ biomedical biotechnology with moral 
questions but generally supported because it gives or save lives. The press measurably 
cultivated this separation (Bauer, 2002a and 2005). The public deliberations of ‘GM 
Nation’ in 2002 are an expression of the split frame: debating GREEN conveniently 
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focuses protest energies and shields RED from undue attention.vi This course of 
events has some similarity with the 1950s, when strategic efforts were made to split 
the public atom into a military and a civil nuclear power under the banner of ‘Atoms 
for Peace’ (Langer, 1995). Weather this was, considering the techno-scientific 
infrastructure, a substantive or a rhetorical split preoccupies analysts ever since facing 
the issue of proliferation (Weiss, 2003). The aftermaths of the 11th of September 2001 
brought to public attention that biotechnology might have a proliferation problem, 
too. However, significant by its absence, in our press corpus less than 0.5 percent of 
articles refer to a potential military uses of biotechnology, and all references predate 
the events of 2001. vii
       
 
Conclusions: towards longitudinal comparative research  
 
In this paper I distinguished two 25(+) year long phases, 1946-1972 and 1973-2002, 
in British public sentiments over genetics and biotechnology. Each phase comprises a 
wave of rising and declining enthusiasm.viii Several topics were identified that 
engaged public opinion through these phases of enthusiasm and concern. Scientists 
themselves raised the alarm on potential hazards of genetic engineering in mid 1970s, 
but with limited impact at the time. These concerns were crowded out by hype and 
enthusiasm for this strategic technology of the 21st century. Twenty years later 
lingering concerns resurfaced and merged with others, such as food safety, 
globalisation and bioethics. This time round the public resonance was far greater. 
Today, the actor-networks of rDNA and genomics engages debates over the safety of 
gm foods, the environmental soundness of gm crops, the corporate dominance over 
gm seeds and biodiversity, the patenting of life forms, the psychological and social 
consequences of genetic identity, the ethics of genetic testing, enhancement and 
embryonic stem cell cloning, the risks of xenotransplants, the prospects of 
individualised medicines and the reliability of DNA finger printing in a genetic 
information society.  
 
Our data shows that the trend has changed towards a more sceptical public attitude to 
biotechnology, so much deplored in the 1990s, started in the press already in the mid 
1980s, and was observable in public perceptions by mid 1990s. The public events of 
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1996/97 did not initiate this trend change, but catalysed it. They internationalised the 
debate and split it worldwide into a matter of either GREEN or RED biotechnology. 
While corporate actors ignored early warnings, issue entrepreneurs successfully 
capitalised on the changing public sentiment and cornered the debate on GREEN 
biotechnology in Britain, probably to the relief of anybody working on RED 
biomedical biotechnology.   
 
Under a long-term perspective, it is tempting to compare biotechnology to other 
technologies and their paths through public opinion. The source of historical analogy 
of genetic engineering will continue to preoccupy actors interested in technological 
futures. Is it the civil nuclear power, the hurdle of public opinion was raised some 
twenty years after a promising start in 1956; or is it the information technologies with 
its bubbling waves of new enthusiasms?  I dare no prediction.  
 
To tell the history of the public imagination of genetics is an historian’s task. Jon 
Turney (1998) admirably traced the footsteps of Frankenstein’s monster through 
various episodes of the popular imagination of biology. This paper might contribute 
two ideas to such ambitions: a criterion for periodization and longitudinal indicators. 
On the example of Britain, I demonstrated two long-term and nested phases in public 
sentiments towards DNA, genetics and biotechnology based on news coverage and 
the evaluation of events offered by this coverage. These phases reflect research 
events, but also trends in the ‘Zeitgeist’, the spatio-temporal mentality. Historians 
may find it helpful to consider such indicators in the construction of a narrative of 
popular genetics. Also, I hope to have demonstrated the need for and the advantages 
of longitudinal indicators, even seemingly crude ones based on content analysis. The 
fluctuating nature of public sentiment, as demonstrated on biotechnology, alerts 
readers to the risks of basing a trend analysis on the comparison of few time windows 
with little information in between. The graphics presented in this paper show that, 
would one pick different windows over the 50 years, very different conclusions on 
trends would result. I summarise the caveat like this: better simple and longitudinal 
(large t) than few and far apart cross-sections (small t). In any problem area, curves 
show best whether one is on the way into or on the way out of trouble. Some 
methodologists generally call for more continuous data streams in psychology and the 
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social sciences to overcome much conceptual and methodological nonsense and to 
enhance causal understanding of processes (Fassnacht, 2000). I concord. 
 
A final comment on how unique this British story might be. Our past research has 
shown considerable divergence in timing and substance of the biotechnology debates, 
within Europe, across the Atlantic, and across the Americas (see Gaskell & Bauer, 
2001). The global convergence on such matters is either wishful thinking or political 
agenda (see Jasanoff, 2005). The international comparison of the representations of 
science and technology in the press must expect convergence and divergence. It is 
likely that the public take-off of modern biotechnology is a common feature. 
However, the timing and the steadiness in increase of coverage during the 1980s, or 
the watershed years of 1996/97 leaves ample space for comparative puzzles.  
Synchronicity is a criterion for an emergent trans-national public sphere, across 
Europe or globally. However, time is fractal and the particular time window of 
‘synchronicity’ determines the conclusion (see for example Seifert, 2003). These are 
eminently empirical questions that depend on the availability of comparable data 
streams. For the period after 1973, our mass media database covers eighteen different 
countries across Europe, North America, and Japan, and researchers are invited to 
consult, contribute and analyse this growing database. Let a thousand comparisons 
flourish ! A global public opinion of science and technology is in the making and the 
challenge is to track it as it happens.  
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i The state of this freedom of speech is subject to global international monitoring, because it can be 
restricted by formal state censorship, dangerous working conditions, self-imposed censorship or 
powerful monopolies of opinions. Occasionally this right to freedom is challenged and tested in courts. 
Britain regularly figures in the upper 15% of the worlds’ countries. In 2002 it ranked 21, in 2004 it 
ranked 24 of 170 ranked countries, top are Scandinavian countries (see reporters without borders on 
www.rsf.org).    
ii There is a rhetorical game played by social scientists: first one proclaims a revolution, the axial 
transition into a new society; and later, to reassure the regulators or when the ‘revolution’ takes longer 
than expected, one calls it off again. Both observations will be news that hit the headlines.  
iii I use ‘we’ in this section, because the methodology is the collective effort of the project 
‘Biotechnology and the Public’ including colleagues from 18 countries.  
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iv This peak of 1666 references to genes or biotechnology needs to be kept in perspective. Back in 1998 
the Guardian regularly compared weekly press coverage: in the eight months May-December 1998, the 
events in Northern Ireland or ‘Clinton Gate’ got two to three times more coverage than all the science 
related stories during that period together. Human stem cell cloning got about 300 column inches in 
December 1998, while the Omagh bomb got 12 times more column inches back in August 1998 alone. 
Hence, compared to political news events of the day biotechnology is at best a mid-size news item even 
at its peak.   
v A new area of sociological research is claimed focussing on this kind of hyperbole: the sociology of 
expectations (see Brown N & M Michael, 2003) 
vi One looks across the Atlantic to sees a mirror image: in the US the recent debate is focussed on the 
RED biotechnology, on genetic testing and in particular on embryonic stem cells cloning, while 
GREEN biotechnology seems to be a non-issue as far as policy is concerned; this is often referred as to 
as ‘transatlantic gap’. In the US this reflects the power of lobbying to set the policy agenda on Capitol 
Hill (see TenEyck, 2001 and Sheingate, in print)   
vii Our 18-country press corpus contains 106 references to military uses out in a total of over 20000 
articles or 60000 gene references (an article is coded for up to three references), of which 23, mainly 
US references, are from 2001 or 2002.   
viii One might be tempted to speak of long cycles, but ‘cycles’ connote too much regularity. To avoid a 
false impression of regularity I used the terms ‘phases’ and ‘waves’ to identify the ups and downs in 
coverage and evaluation.   
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